We propose a model-theoretic de nition of causation, and show that, contrary to common folklore, genuine causal in uences can be distinguished from spurious covariations following standard norms of inductive reasoning. We also establish a complete characterization of the conditions under which such a distinction is possible. Finally, we provide a proof-theoretical procedure for inductive causation and show that, for a large class of data and structures, e ective algorithms exist that uncover the direction of causal in uences as de ned above.
The Model
We view the task of causal modeling as an identi cation game which scientists play against Nature. Nature possesses stable causal mechanisms which, on a microscopic level are deterministic functional relationships between variables, some of which are unobservable. These mechanisms are organized in the form of an acyclic schema which the scientist attempts to identify.
De nition 1 A causal model over a set of variables U is a directed acyclic graph (dag) D, the nodes of which denote variables, and the links denote direct binary causal in uences. The causal model serves as a blue print for forming a \causal theory" { a precise speci cation of how each variable is in uenced by its parents in the dag. Here we assume that Nature is at liberty to impose arbitrary functional relationships between each e ect and its causes and then to weaken these relationships by introducing arbitrary (yet mutually independent) disturbances. These disturbances re ect \hidden" or unmeasurable conditions and exceptions which Nature chooses to govern by some undisclosed probability function.
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Once a causal theory T is formed, it de nes a joint probability distribution P (T) over the variables in the system, and this distribution re ects some features of the causal model (e.g., each variable must be independent of its grandparents, given the values of its parents). Nature then permits the scientist to inspect a select subset O of \observed" variables, and to ask questions about the probability distribution over the observables, but hides the underlying causal theory as well as the structure of the causal model . We investigate the feasibility of recovering the topology of the dag from features of the probability distribution. In principle, with no restriction on the type of models considered, the scientist is unable to make any meaningful assertions about the structure of the underlaying model. For example, he/she can never rule out the possibility that the underlying model is a complete (acyclic) graph; a structure that, with the right choice of parameters can mimic (see De nition 4) the behavior of any other model, regardless of the variable ordering. However, following the standard method of scienti c induction, it is reasonable to rule out any model for which we nd a simpler, less expressive model, equally consistent with the data (see De nition 6. Models that survive this selection are called \minimal models" and with this notion, we construct our de nition of inductive causation:
\ De nition 7 (Induced Causation) GivenP , a variable C has a direct causal in uence on E i a link C ! E exists in every minimal latent structure consistent withP .
We view this de nition as normative, because it is based on one of the least disputed norms of scienti c investigation: Occam's razor in its semantical casting. However, as with any scienti c inquiry, we make no claims that this de nition is guaranteed to always identify stable physical mechanisms in nature; it identi es the only mechanisms we can plausibly induce from non-expiremental data.
As an example of a causal relation that is identi ed by the de nition above, imagine that observations taken over four variables fa; b; c; dg reveal only two vanishing dependencies: \a is independent of b" and \d is independent of fa; bg given c" (plus those that logically follow from the two). This dependence pattern would be typical for example, of the following variables: a = having cold, b = having hay-fever, c = having to sneeze, d = having to wipe ones nose. It is not hard to show that any model which explains the dependence between c and d by an arrow from d to c, or by a hidden common cause between the two, cannot be minimal, because any such model would be able to out-mimic the one shown in gure (1) below. We conclude therefore that the observed dependencies imply a direct causal in uence from c to d. Some minimal (1 and 2) and non-minimal (3 and 4) models consistent with the observations are shown below. However, (5) 
3 Proof Theory
It turns out that while the minimality principle is su cient for forming a normative and operational theory of causation, it does not guarantee that the search through the vast space of minimal models would be computationally practical. If Nature truly conspires to conceal the structure of the underlying model she could annotate that model with a distribution that matches many minimal models, having totally disparate structures. To facilitate an e ective proof theory, we rule out such eventualities, and impose a restriction on the distribution called \stability". It conveys the assumption that all vanishing dependencies are structural, not formed by incidental equalities of numerical parameters. 2
De nition 8 Let I(P) denote the set of all conditional independence relationships embodieded in P . A causal theory T =<D; D > generates a stable distribution i it contains no extraneous independences, i.e. I(P (<D; D >)) I(P (<D; 0 D >)) for any set of parameters 0 D . With the added assumption of stability, every distribution has a unique causal model (up to equivalence), as long as there are no hidden variables. The search for the minimal model then boils down to recovering the structure of the underlying dag from probabilistic dependencies that perfectly re ect this structure (see Verma & Pearl 88 ] for a characterization of these dependencies). This search is exponential in general, but simpli es signi cantly when the underlying structure is sparse (see Verma & Pearl 90] and Spirtes and Glymour, 1991] for such algorithms).
Recovering Latent Structures
When Nature decides to \hide" some variables, the observed distributionP need no longer be stable relative to the observable set O, i.e.P may result from many equivalent minimal latent structures, each containing any number of hidden variables. Fortunately, rather then having to search through this unbounded space of latent structures, it turns out that for every latent structure L, there is an equivalent latent structure called the projection of L on O in which every unobserved node is a root node with exactly two observed children. Theorem 1 Any latent structure has at least one projection (identi able in linear time).
It is convenient to represent projections by bi-directional graph with only the observed variables as vertices (i.e., leaving the hidden variables implicit). Each bi-directed link in such a graph represents a common hidden cause of the variables corresponding to the link's end points.
Theorem 1 renders our de nition of induced causation (De nition 7) operational; we will show (Theorem 2) that if a certain link exists in a distinguished projection of any minimal model ofP, it must indicate the existence of a causal path in every minimal model ofP. Thus the search reduces to nding a projection of any minimal model ofP and identifying the appropriate links. Remarkably, these links can be identi ed by a simple procedure, the IC-algorithm, which is not more complex than that which recovers the unique minimal model in the case of fully observable structures.
IC Algorithm (Inductive Causation)
Input:P a sampled distribution.
Output: core(P) a marked hybrid acyclic graph. 
Summary and Intuition
For the sake of completeness we now present explicit de nitions of potential and genuine causation, as they emerge from Theorem 2 and the IC-algorithm. (1) in De nition 12 may be established either by statistical methods (per De nition 11) or by other sources of information e.g., experimental studies or temporal succession (i.e. that Z precedes X in time). When temporal information is available, as it is assumed in the formulations of Suppes 70], Granger, 1987] and Spohn, 1983] , then every link constructed in step 1 of the IC-algorithm corresponds to a potential cause (genuine or spurious cause in Suppes terminology). In such cases, De nition 12 can be used to distinguish genuine from spurious causes without requiring that all causally relevant background factors be measurable.
The intuition behind our de nitions (and the IC-recovery procedure) is rooted in Reichenbach's (1956) \common cause" principle stating that if two events are correlated, but one does not cause the other, then there must be causal explanation to both of them, an explanation that renders them conditionally independent. As it turns out the pattern that provides us with information about causal directionality is not the \common cause" but rather the \common e ect". The argument goes as follows: If we create conditions ( xing S ab ) where two variables, a and b, are each correlated with a third variable c but are independent of each other, then the third variable cannot act as a cause of a or b; it must be either their common e ect, a ! c b, or be associated with a and b via common causes, forming a pattern such as a $ c $ b. This is indeed the eventuality that permits our algorithm to begin orienting edges in the graph (step 2), and assign arrowheads pointing at c. Another explanation of this principle appeals to the perception of \voluntary control" Pearl 88, page 396]. The reason people insist that the rain causes the grass to become wet, and not the other way around, is that they can nd other means of getting the grass wet, totally independent of the rain. Transferred to our chain a ? c ? b, we can preclude c from being a cause of a if we nd another means of potentially controlling c without a ecting a, namely b.
The notion of genuine causation also rests on the \common e ect" principle: Two causal events do not become dependent simply by virtue of predicting a common e ect. Thus, a series of spurious associations, each resulting from a separate common cause, is not transitive; it predicts independence between the rst and last variables in the chain. For example, if I hear my sprinklers turn on, it suggests that my grass is wet, but not that the parking lot at the local supermarket is wet even though the latter two events are highly correlated by virtue of a common cause in the form of rain. 5 Therefore, if correlation is measured between my sprinkler and the wetness of the parking lot then there ought to be a non-spurious causal connection between the wetness of my grass and that of the parking lot (such as the water saturating my lawn, running o into the gutter and into the parking lot).
Conclusions
The results presented in this paper dispel the claim that statistical analysis can never distinguish genuine causation from spurious covariation Otte 81], Gardenfors, 1988] . We show that certain patterns of dependencies dictate a direct causal relationship between variables, one that cannot be attributed to hidden causes lest we violate one of the basic maxims of scienti c methodology: the semantical version of Occam's razor.
On the practical side, we have shown that the assumption of model minimality, together with that of \stability" (no accidental independencies) lead to an e ective algorithm of recovering causal structures, transparent as well as latent. Simulation studies conducted at our laboratory show that networks containing twenty variables require less than 5000 samples to have their structure recovered by the algorithm. Another result of practical importance is the following: Given a proposed causal theory of some phenomenon, our algorithm can identify in linear time those causal relationships that could potentially be substantiated by observational studies, and those whose directionality can only be determined by controlled, manipulative experiments.
From a methodological viewpoint, our results should settle some of the on going disputes between the descriptive and structural approaches to theory formation Freedman 87]. It shows that the methodology governing path-analytic techniques is legitimate, faithfully adhering to the traditional norms of scienti c investigation. At the same time our results also explicate the assumptions upon which these techniques are based, and the conditions that must be ful lled before claims made by these techniques can be accepted.
